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Abstract
This paper studies the incidence and consequences of the mismatch between
formal education and the educational requirements of jobs in Estonia during the
years 1997-2003. We ￿nd large wage penalties associated with the phenomenon of
educational mismatch. Moreover, the incidence and wage penalty of mismatches
increase with age. This suggests that structural educational mismatches can occur
after fast transition periods. Our results are robust for various methodologies, and
more importantly regarding departures from the exogeneity assumptions inherent in
the matching estimators used in our analysis.
Keywords: Education mismatch, Wage determination, Matching Estimators
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Executive Summary
This paper analyzes the incidence and consequences of educational mismatch in Es-
tonia, an economy that has su⁄ered a rapid period of structural transformation. Estonia
has undergone a rapid transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, and
then later a rapid transformation in its productive structure as a consequence of its EU
accession. This is an ongoing process and the consequences are likely to be long lasting.
This paper documents one of the outcomes of such a process: the mismatch between the
formal education of workers and the curricular content of their jobs. We ￿nd that the
incidence of overeducation in Estonia during the period of study (1997-2003) is high;
more than 12% of workers are formally overeducated for their jobs. This proportion is
higher among older workers, and in the case of women it increases monotonically with
age. The wage penalty associated with overeducation is quite large, lowering wages on
average by 24%, except among younger cohorts, a group in which wage losses associated
with overeducation are of a magnitude comparable to those found in other European
countries. A battery of robustness checks using non-parametric methods suggests that
it is unlikely that these results are driven by unobserved heterogeneity.
Our ￿ndings are consistent with expectations from a rapidly changing transition
economy. A fast speed of structural change can render obsolete educational diplomas that
were obtained in the previous regime, triggering a mismatch between formal education
and labour demand. This implies that summary indicators of average years of schooling
in transition countries should be treated with caution, since they might constitute a poor
proxy for the true human capital of the working age population.6
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the incidence and consequences of educational mismatch in Estonia,
an economy that has su⁄ered a rapid period of structural transformation. Estonia joined
the European Union (EU) together with other 9 Central and Eastern European countries
on May 1st 2004. A prominent feature of these new EU members was their low GDP
per capita when compared to the older partners. Overall, the new members increased
the EU population by 20%, reaching 450 million, while the Union￿ s GDP increased by
only 5%. These sharp di⁄erences in terms of GDP per capita brought new challenges
for both the old and new member states. Regarding the latter group, it is often argued
that one of the channels that should facilitate their economic convergence towards the
levels of wellbeing experienced by the former states (hereinafter the EU-15) is the high
level of education of their workforce.1 This view is based on indicators of average years
of schooling in the new members, which are often higher than those of the EU-15. In
Estonia, among people aged over 25 the average level of schooling in 1999 was 9.2 years,
clearly greater than the EU-15 average of 8.7 (Barro and Lee, 2001). For the other new
EU members, the numbers are similar; e.g., Poland had 9.2 years of schooling on average.
We argue that this fact needs to be quali￿ed, in the sense that in the new EU mem-
bers, education was designed to meet the needs of a centrally planned economy, and
workers￿human capital might not be best suited to rapidly catching up with the west.
In Lamo, Messina and Wasmer (2006) we show that skill speci￿cities in former centrally
planned economies slow down signi￿cantly the adjustment process in periods of rapid
structural changes. In this paper, we study mismatches in ￿formal￿education (hereafter
called educational mismatch) in Estonia during the period 1997-2003. Workers￿human
capital depreciation might bring in mismatches between their formal education and their
jobs. This might not necessarily imply a mismatch between workers￿productive skills and
the skills required by the market, but simply that workers were trained with skills that
are actually not demanded anymore. Hence, even if individuals are optimally allocated
given their productive skills, they might be formally overeducated. For the purposes
1See for instance Caselli and Tenreyro (2004), who make this point when they discuss the prospects
of convergence for Poland.7
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of our study, Estonia constitutes an ideal laboratory. Estonia quickly adjusted from a
centrally planned to a free market economy in the early 1990s. It went through a process
of drastic reforms, which resulted in strong sectoral reallocations and a rapid privatiza-
tion of the public ￿rms. By 1997, the starting period for this study￿ s analysis, Estonia
had been transformed into a fully functional market economy. Moreover, its regula-
tory and labour market institutions o⁄er a very ￿ exible environment for EU standards,
characterized by relatively low employment protection and unemployment bene￿ts, and
almost non-existent trade unions. Compared to other transition countries, the relatively
weak safety nets and extremely ￿ exible wage setting institutions (see Messina and Rıım,
2009) in Estonia are likely to keep in the market workers who su⁄ered important skill
depreciations.
A large volume of empirical literature studies the consequences of mismatches be-
tween workers￿formal education and their jobs￿educational requirements. In all of these
studies a wage penalty is associated with the overeducation phenomenon, i.e., workers
who are educated for a more quali￿ed job than the one they hold earn less than work-
ers with the same education but holding in a job that requires their quali￿cation level.
A major di¢ culty in interpreting this wage penalty as the causal e⁄ect of educational
mismatch on wages lies on the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity. Skills unobserved
by the econometrician (e.g., low ability) might be correlated with overeducation and
wages, biasing the estimated coe¢ cients. Bauer (2002) shows that almost 70% of the
wage penalty associated with overeducation dissipates once individual ￿xed e⁄ects are
introduced in a panel framework. Although appealing, panel techniques might not solve
all selection problems. If more able individuals are more likely to leave the jobs for which
they are overeducated, panel estimates would also deliver biased coe¢ cients. Moreover,
as is well know, individual e⁄ects exacerbate the impact of measurement errors, inherent
in any measure of overeducation. Other approaches dealing with unobserved heterogene-
ity include the use of instrumental variables (Dolton and Silles, 2001), controlling for
ability using di⁄erent proxies (see Chevalier, 2003 and McGuinness, 2003) and proxying
ability by di⁄erentiating between groups of workers in a quantile regression framework
(Budr￿a and Moro-Egido, 2006 and McGuinness and Bennett, 2007). More recently,8
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non-parametric approaches have been proposed to deal with the problem of confounding
factors (McGuinness, 2008, McGuinness and Sloane, 2009 and Mavromaras, McGinness
and Fok, 2009). Our paper is directly related to the latter.
Our preferred estimates rely on nearest neighbors matching estimator techniques
(Abadie and Imbens, 2006), which do not impose any functional form on the impact of
￿formal￿overeducation (hereafter overeducation) on wages. More importantly, we do
several robustness exercises that show the impact of unobserved heterogeneity in the
estimates, following Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008). In the absence of strong priors
about the exogeneity of overeducation or credible instruments, our strategy is to assess
non-parametrically how robust our results are to the presence of an unobserved con-
founder, which can be simulated in several forms. A similar strategy has been proposed
by McGuinness and Sloane (2009) and Mavromaras et al. (2009). The former studies
the e⁄ects of educational mismatches on wages in the market of UK graduates, while
the latter studies the incidence and wage impact of skill mismatches in the Australian
labor market. In both cases, sensitivity analysis of the wage e⁄ects of overeducation
(or overskilling) are carried out following Rosenbaum (2002), which allows examining
the sensitivity of signi￿cance levels and con￿dence intervals in the presence of an un-
observed variable. Like Rosenbaum (2002), we do not rely on any parametric model.
Di⁄erently from previous papers, our method aims instead at assessing the sensitivity
of point estimates (rather than con￿dence intervals), under di⁄erent scenarios for the
distribution of the confounding factor.
Our ￿ndings indicate that the incidence of overeducation in Estonia during the period
of study is higher among older workers, and in the case of women it increases monoton-
ically with age. The wage penalty associated with overeducation is quite large, lowering
wages on average by 24%. Moreover, this wage penalty also increases with age: older
overeducated workers receive a higher wage penalty than (otherwise similarly) younger
overeducated workers. In order to assess the impact of various forms of unobserved
heterogeneity in the estimated e⁄ects, we ￿rst assume that selection on the unobserv-
ables is the same as selection on the observables, in an empirical strategy that closely
resembles Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005). We ￿nd that in this case the impact on the9
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estimates is minimal. Next, we pose to the data the following question. Suppose there is
an unobserved factor, call it ￿ability￿ , which is negatively correlated with wages but is
more likely to be present among the overeducated individuals. Under what distribution
of this confounding factor the impact of overeducation on wages is driven to zero? As
expected, our results are sensitive to the distribution of this confounding factor, but
remain negative and highly signi￿cant even in relatively extreme cases. Suppose that
among the overeducated 85% are ￿low ability￿individuals, while only 15% of the well-
matched belong to this group. Further, assume that the probability of ￿nding a ￿low
ability￿worker with a wage below the mean among well-matched individuals doubles
the probability of ￿nding a ￿low ability￿worker with a wage above the mean. Then,
once this confounding factor is taken into account in the estimation, the elasticity of
wages on overeducation declines to -0.16 (from -0.24 in the baseline) for females, and to
-0.14 (from -0.24) for males, and remains highly signi￿cant. Similar exercises lead us to
conclude that all the wage penalty associated with educational mismatches is unlikely
to be driven by unobserved worker characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an institutional and
macroeconomic background of the Estonian economy. Section 3 discusses the theoretical
underpinnings of overeducation, the di⁄erent measures of overeducation proposed in
the literature and the data used in this paper, while Section 4 studies the incidence
of overeducation in Estonia. Section 5 discusses the matching estimator applied in the
rest of the paper and studies the consequences of overeducation for wages. Section 6
assesses the quality and reliability of the estimates, paying special attention to the role
of unobserved heterogeneity. Section 7 presents our study￿ s conclusions.
2 Background
Estonia joined the EU following more than a decade of major reforms intended to real-
locate its resources and change its institutional structures so that it would be compliant
with market economy principles. Estonia is a small country that, after gaining indepen-
dence from the Soviet Union in 1991, introduced its own currency pegged to the German10
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DM. It then launched drastic economic reforms, which have been quali￿ed as leading to
some of the most rapid and successful transitions. Currently Estonia has an extremely
open economy, with a reasonably sized public sector (most public companies were pri-
vatized before 1993). This transition to a market economy was accomplished through
a large increase in worker ￿ ows (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2002) and sectoral reallo-
cation: the proportion of agricultural workers dropped from over 20% in 1990 to 8% in
2000. At the same time, there was a remarkable increase in the proportion workers em-
ployed in services: from 43% in 1990 to about 60% in 2002. Following the 1992 reforms,
Estonia experienced negative real GDP growth rates during three consecutive years until
1995, when the economy started to recover. In 1999, one year after the announcement
that Estonia would join the EU, the GDP growth rate again became negative, and since
then recovered strongly in 2000 to reach a stable growth level of 6.5% up to 2003. The
unemployment rate was 9.2% in 1998 and increased between 1999 and 2000 (11.3 and
12.5% respectively), but subsequently it declined to 11.8 and 9.1% in 2001 and 2002.
By EU standards, Estonia￿ s market economy is considered very ￿ exible in terms of
labour legislation and labour market institutions. Moreover, there is no e⁄ective trade
union movement in￿ uencing wages in Estonia. Since 1991 the government has only set
minimum wages, while individual wages have been set at the ￿rm level through bilateral
agreements between employers and employees. No policy has been established to prevent
bankruptcy, and layo⁄s and separation costs remained very low during the period of
analysis. The ￿Employment Contracts Act￿was introduced in 1992, in order to stimulate
labour reallocation. This law gave employers the right to layo⁄workers with two months
noti￿cation. At the same time workers are entitled to a maximum severance payment
equivalent to 4 times their monthly salary. Because this established no limitations on
renewals, it also opened up the possibility of the extensive use of temporary contracts,
but their cumulative duration should not exceed 5 years. Unemployment insurance and
income support are not very generous in Estonia. Unemployment bene￿ts have been
￿xed at 60% of the minimum wage, which amounts to less than 25% of the average
wage. Replacement ratios dropped from 32% in 1990 to 7% in 1998, and eligibility
conditions are also very restrictive. The duration of unemployment bene￿ts is limited to11
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6 months, after which the unemployed could receive social assistance, which is also very
limited. Consequently, it can be hardly argued that unemployment bene￿ts and social
assistance have any disincentive e⁄ect on labour supply. Only training programs act as
active labour market policies in Estonia. From 1993 to 1995, both public expenditures
and participation in training programs increased substantially.
3 Educational mismatch: theoretical considerations and
empirical identi￿cation
Educational mismatch may be a permanent or a temporary state. In a matching frame-
work, Jovanovic (1979) shows that temporary educational mismatches can arise due
to ine¢ ciencies in the functioning of the labour market associated with imperfect in-
formation and mobility. Educational mismatch is also a temporary phenomenon in a
career mobility framework, where young workers voluntarily accept jobs for which they
are overeducated in exchange of a skill acquisition process that will complement their
quali￿cations (Sicherman and Galor, 1990). In both cases workers are expected to im-
prove over time their matches either through job-to-job mobility or mobility within the
￿rm. Hence, educational mismatches are expected to alleviate while the worker obtains
labour market experience. Educational mismatches, on the other hand, might re￿ ect
a permanent phenomenon. This is the case in models where employers use formal ed-
ucation as a screening device (Spence, 1973) or when low and high educated workers
compete for scarce jobs in the presence of frictions (see Albrecht and Vroman, 2002 and
Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno, 2008). In the latter models, structural mismatches may be
exacerbated by supply forces such as rapid educational upgrades in the labour force, or
by demand forces, such as skill biased technological change. Both cases imply a rapid
change in the demand for or supply of certain educational group that cannot be easily
matched on the other side of the market.
A large volume of empirical literature studies the determinants and economic con-
sequences of mismatches between individuals￿ formal education and the educational
requirements of their jobs. Following Freeman￿ s (1976) seminal book, this literature12
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identi￿es workers as being over or undereducated relative to their job, and studies the
consequences of educational mismatches on wages and other labour market outcomes.
Regarding the impact of overeducation on earnings, McGuinness (2006) reviews this lit-
erature and concludes that all studies ￿nd a signi￿cant wage penalty associated with
overeducation, which averages at 15 percent lower wages. Although there is some dis-
agreement in the literature on the rationale for temporary mismatches, i.e., if they are
related to market failures or career mobility, most studies ￿nds signs of overeducation
being a temporary phenomenon. The fact that overeducation is typically higher during
the school to work transition years is suggestive of the short term nature of educa-
tional mismatches. Consistent with this interpretation, overeducation has been found
to be associated with higher mobility rates (e.g., Alba-Ram￿rez, 1993, Sloane, Battu,
and Seaman, 1999 and Groot and van den Brink, 2003) or within ￿rm promotions (e.g.,
Alba-Ram￿rez and BlÆzquez, 2003 and Groeneveld and Hartog, 2004). Also in line with a
temporary interpretation, Groot (1996) ￿nds that overeducation declines with age. How-
ever, in contrast with overeducation being a temporary phenomenon, several studies of
the labour market of graduates fail to ￿nd a declining incidence of overeducation during
the ￿rst years after graduation (see McGuinness and Wooden, 2009 for a discussion).
The empirical literature on education mismatch typically relies on three kinds of
measures of over/undereducation, depending on the speci￿c features of the data set and
the information available: i) objective or data-based measures are based on contrasts
between the actual distribution of workers￿educational attainment and an (estimated)
adequate level of education per occupation. This adequate level of education is either
measured as a function of the average (see Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989) or the modal
(Mendes de Oliveira, Santos and Kiker, 2000) level of education for each occupation, ii)
measures based on the contrast between the educational level of workers and the required
level of education for their job, derived from systematic evaluation by job analysts who
specify the required level of education for the job titles in an occupational classi￿cation
(Hartog, 1980) and iii) the so-called subjective or direct measures of education mismatch,
based on workers￿self-assessments (Sicherman, 1981). There are pros and cons associated
with each of these measures. The advantage of educational mismatch measures based on13
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worker self-assessment is that they identify how the individual￿ s situation can be assigned
relative to the education mismatch, and precisely with the individual￿ s job, and not with
any kind of aggregate (Hartog, 2000). The disadvantage however is that they might
su⁄er from workers￿misperceptions regarding their actual job requirements. The main
arguments in favour of data-based indexes is that they are not impeded by subjectivity,
yet one important drawback is that di⁄erent de￿nitions of what constitutes adequate
schooling levels typically deliver very di⁄erent results. Conceptually, systematic analysis
from job analysts should provide the best measures of required education for the job.
However, van der Velden and van Smoorenburg (1997) show that worker self assessments
of the educational requirements for their jobs are typically much more accurate than
expert rating of job titles. Moreover, systematic expert rating analysis is expensive and
consequently infrequently updated. This renders the characterization of jobs rapidly
obsolete, especially in periods of rapid structural changes.
3.1 The data
The Estonian labour force survey (ELFS) has a structure very similar to the LFSs car-
ried out in the other EU member states, using internationally agreed concepts and de￿-
nitions as proposed by the International Labor Organization (ILO). It contains standard
demographic and job characteristics, and its longitudinal nature allows individuals to be
followed for a maximum of 1.5 years. The ELFS was ￿rst conducted in 1995 and on an
annual basis until 2000q1, when the methodology changed. From 2000q2 the data was
collected quarterly and the panel followed a 2-2-2 rotation plan. This implies that every
household was interviewed for two quarters, not observed during the next two quarters
and interviewed again for two consecutive quarters. All the surveys are strati￿ed sam-
ples of the population census, and are representative of the population in the age bracket
15-74. The response rate is very high, always above 90%. The 1997 survey interviewed
5,555 individuals, while the 1998 and 1999 ELFS sampled around 14,000 individuals,
and 25% of the 1998 sample was retained in the 1999 survey. After 2000, some 10,000
individuals are interviewed every year. From the ￿rst part of the survey we retained the
1997, 1998 and 1999 waves, which contain information from the second quarter of the14
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year, and then we exploited the quarterly information thereafter.2 Our analysis period
is 1997-2003.
The Estonian labour force survey made it possible to construct a direct educational
mismatch measure, based on the respondents￿perceived level of required education for
their job. All employees were asked: ￿Does your job correspond to your educational
level?￿and were o⁄ered three response options: ￿Yes￿ , ￿No, the job presupposes a more
advanced level of education￿or ￿No, the job presupposes a lower level of education￿ .
Note that the question explicitly asks about the educational level, and not about the
skills of the individual. The question should be informative about the quality of the
match between the formal education received by the worker and the level of education
required for her job. Hence, it is certainly possible that workers who answer negatively
to the above question are paid according to their relative productivities. In other words,
the presence of mismatch in our sample is not necessarily indicative of market failures in
the Estonian labour market. It might simply re￿ ect that workers were trained for jobs
or occupations that are not demanded in the market anymore.
Using this information it is possible to directly construct measures of over/undereducation.
In our data 12.6% of the workers declared that they were overeducated for the job, and
2.5% were undereducated. Since the estimation methodology described in Section 5 was
designed for dichotomous treatment, we focused the analysis on the overeducated, and
excluded undereducated from the sample.3 The outcome measure in the paper is the net
monthly wage. When the individual is employed in more than one job, we retain the job
with the highest salary as the main job. We limit the sample to employees, in the age
bracket 16-65.
2The 1997, 1998, and 1999 contain retrospective information that can be used to construct quarterly
data. However, the information on the matching between the education of the individual and the job
refers to the reference week (the second quarter of each year).
3We have estimated OLS regressions, including both over and undereducation indicators, and did not
￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence in wages between undereducated and well-matched workers. We obtain very
similar results when we apply matching estimators to the sample of workers who are undereducated,
having well-matched workers as the control group.15
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4 Who is overeducated in Estonia
Table 1 lists certain summary statistics showing important di⁄erences between overe-
ducated and well-matched workers. On average the latter earn more and have fewer
years of education than the overeducated. Among women and interestingly among older
workers, there is a higher incidence of the overeducation. For more detail on the rela-
tionship between overeducation and age see Figure 1, which reveals that the incidence
of overeducation for females increases monotonically with age, yet slightly less so for
older workers. For males, the age overeducation pro￿le increases (non-monotonically)
with age, and among the older cohorts overeducated individuals are overrepresented. It
is also interesting to note that Estonian origin individuals (based on the ￿rst language
spoken at home) are much more likely to be well match than workers from other origins.
As for job features, overeducated workers seem to concentrate more on the private sec-
tor and in manufacturing in particular, and also exhibit lower job tenure (4.5 years on
average versus 7.3 for the well-matched).
To obtain a better understanding of the factors behind overeducation, we estimate
a probit model where the dependent variable is assigned the value 1 when individuals
declare themselves to be overeducated for the job. We do this separately for males
and females, as overeducation seemed to follow di⁄erent patterns in each case. Table 2
lists the marginal e⁄ects evaluated at the mean of the continuous variables, and discrete
changes in the case of the dichotomous variables, of the expected changes in the predicted
overeducation probability as a function of personal and job characteristics. Since we
observe individuals more than once, we report robust standard errors and allow for
clustering at the individual level.
According to the estimates in Table 2, the patterns observed concerning age are
con￿rmed by the regression analysis; i.e., overeducation increases monotonically with
age among women, while for males, overeducation is concentrated among the oldest,
even though the age pro￿le is not monotonic. Remarkable di⁄erences are also observed
between the genders concerning the importance of certain job features, such as sector of
operation and ￿rm size. Similarly, working in the public sector increases the probability
of being overeducated much more for male than for female workers. Di⁄erences across16
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Estonian and other origin remain, but the marginal e⁄ects both for males and females
become quite small when controlling for other characteristics.
It must be stressed that some of the job characteristics included in these probit regres-
sions might be considered endogenous with respect to overeducation, since overeducated
workers may tend to concentrate on certain sectors or remain in their jobs for shorter
periods. We will take care of this simultaneity in the next section, when we evaluate the
consequences of overeducation for wages.
This exploratory analysis provided a remarkable message in that age increases the
likelihood of being overeducated, and this ￿nding is in contrast with previous empirical
evidence (see Groot, 1996). From a human capital perspective, this is suggestive of
structural changes in the Estonian labour market wherein new abilities are required,
that the old educational system failed to provide.4 The rest of this paper studies the
impact of overeducation on wages, and whether that impact di⁄ers across cohorts.
5 The impact of overeducation on wages
5.1 Methodology
In this section we investigate the consequences of educational mismatch on wages by es-
timating Mincerian earnings regressions that include a dummy for overeducation among
the covariates, making it possible to compare wages of workers su⁄ering from education
mismatch with those of workers having similar features but being well-matched. This
approach was ￿rst applied by Duncan and Ho⁄man (1981), and has generated a wide
range of literature, typically ￿nding that a wage penalty is associated with overeduca-
tion. Our dependent variable is the log of hourly wages and we separate the male and
female sub-samples. Moreover, as we observed that the incidence of overeducation was
higher among older workers, we split the sample in di⁄erent age groups to assess whether
4In alternative speci￿cations, we have identi￿ed individuals who attended school entirely under central
planning and compared them to those who got at least some formal education after 1991. The results,
available upon request, are very similar for females, suggesting that the likelihood of being overeducated
is higher for those who studied during the previous regime. In the case of males, the signs are the
expected but signi￿cance greatly depends on the speci￿c assumptions we make about the threshold for
education before and after.17
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where IM(i) is the set of indices for the ￿rst M matches for individual i. Hence, the







(Yi ￿ ^ Yi(0)), (4)
where N1 denotes the number of treated individuals in the sample. AI show that due
to matching discrepancies this estimator has a bias of the order O(N￿1=K), where K
is the number of continuous covariates. They suggest combining the matching process
with a regression in order to adjust the di⁄erences within the matches to the di⁄erences
in their covariate values. This adjustment is based on an estimate of the regression
function ￿w(x) ￿ E[Y (w)jX = x] for the control group.5 This bias adjustment makes
the matching estimators N1=2 consistent. In our case, as will be seen in the next section,
no major discrepancies exist between simple matching and bias corrected estimators.
This might be expected because our only continuous control variables are age, job tenure
and years of schooling.
5.2 Estimation Results
Our aim is to provide robust evidence of the consequences of educational mismatch. To
this end we report average wage penalties for the overeducated according to various esti-
mation methods: i) the unconditional mean di⁄erence estimator, ii) OLS estimators and
iii) several matching estimators. We present the results of simple matching and biased
adjusted matching techniques for one and four matches (M=1 and M=4, respectively).
We also examine two di⁄erent equation speci￿cations; the ￿rst including a restricted
number of controls, from which we have excluded certain job features that could be en-
dogenous to overeducation (e.g., tenure, ￿rm size, sector of operation). These are most
likely intermediate outcomes, and hence if included in the regression a downward bias is
likely to in￿ uence the overall e⁄ect of overeducation on wages. The second speci￿cation
includes a larger number of controls, some of which are the above mentioned potential
5AI use nonparametric estimation to impute the value for the non-treated.20
ECB




-56@9  G<CKG H<9 9GH=A5H98 5J9F5;9 K5;9 D9B5@HM -- G9D5F5H9@M :CF H<9 9BH=F9
G5AD@9 C: A5@9G 5B8 :9A5@9G IG=B; H<9 56CJ9	 A9BH=CB98 9GH=A5H=CB A9H<C8G5 B 8H < 9
65G9@=B9 G9H C: 7CJ5F=5H9G
 -<9 F9;F9GGCFG =B7@I898 5F9 5 8IAAM :CF 9H<B=7 CF=;=B HKC
8IAA=9G :CF A5F=H5@ GH5HIG M95FG C: 98I75H=CB 5 EI58F5H=7 =B 5;9 H=A9 5B8F 9 ; = C B 5 @
8IAA=9G 5B8 5B =B8=75HCF J5F=56@9 :CF CJ9F98I75H=CB
 -<9 F9GI@HG 5F9 J9FM FC6IGH 57FCGG
H<9 9GH=A5H=CB A9H<C8G
 CF GHCB=5 H<9 5J9F5;9 K5;9 D9B5@HM 8I9 HC CJ9F98I75H=CB
=G 56CIH  HC   :CF :9A5@9G 89D9B8=B; CB H<9 9GH=A5H=CB A9H<C8 5B8 G@=;<H@M
@ C K 9 F5 H H C  : C FA 5 @ 9 G 
  "H G<CI@8 69 BCH98 H<5H H<=G K5;9 D9B5@HM =G EI=H9 <=;<
K<9B 7CAD5F98 HC 5J5=@56@9 F9GI@HG :CF CH<9F IFCD95B 7CIBHF=9G G99  FCCH &55G9B
5B8 F=B? 
 .G=B; 7CAD5F56@9 85H5 5B8 5B CJ9F98I75H=CB A95GIF9 G=A=@5F HC CIFG
I8FZ5 5B8 &CFC	;=8C  OB8 H<5H H<9 K5;9 D9B5@HM 5GGC7=5H98 K=H< CJ9F98I75H=CB
F5B;9G :FCA 
 HC 
 57FCGG  .	 7CIBHF=9G =B H<9 D9F=C8 	

-56@9  @=GHG F9GI@HG :CF J5F=CIG 5;9 ;FCIDG =H 897CADCG9G H<9 G5AD@9 =BHC :CIF 5;9
75H9;CF=9G 	 	 	 5B8 	
 0<9B K9 @CC? 5H 5;9 ;FCIDG =H =G =BH9F9GH=B;
HC BCH9 H<5H H<9 D9B5@HM :CF MCIB;9F 7C<CFHG 5;98  HC  =G 8F5GH=75@@M GA5@@9F 5B8 @9GG
GH56@9 57FCGG H<9 J5F=CIG A9H<C8G 69HK99B  5B8  :CF KCA9B 5B8 69HK99B  5B8 
:CF A9B
 "B 6CH< H<9 A5@9 5B8 :9A5@9 75G9G H<9 K5;9 D9B5@HM 5GGC7=5H98 K=H< CJ9F98I75	
H=CB =B7F95G9G K=H< 5;9
 "B H<9 75G9 C: :9A5@9G H<=G =B7F95G9 =G DFC;F9GG=J9 CJ9F98I75H98
:9A5@9G 5;98 	 <5J9 5 <=;<9F K5;9 D9B5@HM H<5B A=88@9 5;98 :9A5@9G 	 K=H<
5 8=X9F9B79 C: 5FCIB8  D9F79BH5;9 DC=BHG 5B8 K=H< GA5@@ J5F=5H=CBG 89D9B8=B; CB H<9
9GH=A5H=CB A9H<C8 IG98
 -<9 8=X9F9B79 69HK99B A=88@9	5;98 :9A5@9G 5B8 H<CG9 5;98
	 =G G@=;<H@M GA5@@9F 5H 56CIH  D9F79BH5;9 DC=BHG
 CF A5@9G H<9 8=X9F9B79G 57FCGG
7C<CFHG <5J9 G=A=@5F A5;B=HI89G K=H< H<9 C@89GH A5@9G <=H 6M H<9 <=;<9GH K5;9 D9B5@HM
F5B;=B; 69HK99B  5B8 

 DCH9BH=5@ DFC6@9A K9 8C BCH 895@ K=H< <9F9 F9@5H9G HC H<9 @56CIF A5F?9H D5FH=7=D5H=CB 897=G=CB
C: :9A5@9G
 0<=@9 :9A5@9 @56CIF :CF79 D5FH=7=D5H=CB =G F9@5H=J9@M <=;< =B GHCB=5 5J9F5;=B; 5H 
8IF=B; H<9 G5AD@9 D9F=C8 =H =G 7@95F@M @CK9F H<5B A5@9G 5H 
 -C H<9 9LH9 B HH < 5 HH < 9A C G HG 9 J 9 F 9 @ M
CJ9F98I75H98 :9A5@9G K9F9 CIH C: H<9 @56CIF A5F?9H CIF 9GH=A5H9G C: H<9 9X97HG C: CJ9F98I75H=CB CB
:9A5@9 K5;9G KCI@8 69 8CKBK5F8 6=5G98

09 <5J9 5@GC GD@=HH98 H<9 G5AD@9 69HK99B KCF?9FG K<C OB=G<98 G7<CC@ 69:CF9  5B8 H<CG9 K<C 5H
@95GH <58 GCA9 G7<CC@=B; 5:H9F H<=G M95F 5B8 K9 C6H5=B J9FM G=A=@5F F9GI@HG
 0<=@9 H<9 9GH=A5H98 9X97HG C:
CJ9F98I75H=CB CB K5;9G 5F9 B9;5H=J9 5B8 <=;<@M G=;B=O75BH =B H<9 75G9 C: KCF?9FG HF5=B98 9BH=F9@M 8IF=B;21
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1215
June 2010
Table 5 lists the estimated ATT according to age groups for our extended speci-
￿cation, where we add to the above-mentioned control set the following (potentially
endogenous) variables: a quadratic in tenure, a public sector dummy, ￿rm-size dummies
and sectoral dummies. The table only displays OLS and our preferred matching estima-
tor (the bias adjusted matching estimator for one match), because the results are very
similar for the alternative matching methods. Drastic changes are not observed with
respect to the basic speci￿cation. The order of magnitude of the wage penalty as well as
the age pro￿le and the comparison between males and females barely remain unchanged,
but there is a slightly lower wage penalty for the oldest group in both genders, as well
as for males aged 30-39.
On average, wage penalties due to overeducation appear to be much higher in Estonia
than in other EU-15 countries where similar studies were done. Interestingly, the wage
penalty in Estonia associated with overeducation among young workers is lower than
that found for older cohorts, and of similar magnitude to that found in other EU-15
countries. This highlights that the di⁄erential behavior of the Estonian labour market
when it comes to wage penalties associated with overeducation lies in the older cohorts.
6 Assessing the quality and reliability of the estimates
This section provides some evidence supporting the reliability of our estimates. First,
it assesses the quality of matching, that is, whether individuals in the treatment and
control groups are really alike. Second, some sensitivity analyses are made regarding the
robustness of our estimates in the event that the unconfoundedness assumption fails.
6.1 Quality of the matching
To evaluate the quality of matched pairs used in our estimation we follow the same strat-
egy as Abadie and Imbens (2006). Table 6 lists evidence of the quality of matching for
the variables used in the basic speci￿cation (excluding potential intermediate outcomes).
the communist regime, they present much smaller orders of magnitude (and are not always statistically
di⁄erent from zero) for workers who obtained their diplomas after 1991.22
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1215
June 2010
All covariates were normalized such that their mean would be zero and their variance
would be equal to one. The ￿rst panel lists the results of the female samples, and the
second panel lists those of the male samples. The second and third columns in Table
6 show the average value of each covariate for the overeducated and the well-matched
before matching. The di⁄erence between the second and the third columns is reported
in the fourth column. The ￿fth and sixth columns list the average of the covariates for
both groups, computed using the same observations as those in the single matching case
(M = 1). The seventh column displays the average di⁄erence within the matched pairs
for each covariate. The matching is quite good, and its impact on the di⁄erence between
overeducated and well-matched samples is substantial. Before matching, there were large
di⁄erences between treated and control units for a relatively large set of control variables
(e.g., ethnic origin, divorced/widowed, county dummies). In all cases the average dif-
ference between the treatment and control group was much smaller after matching than
before (compare columns 4 and 7). For several covariates the matching was even exact
(the di⁄erence after matching is zero or very close to zero).
6.2 Sensitivity to departures from the unconfoundedness assumption
The main behavioral assumption behind unconfoundedness is that in the case of no treat-
ment the potential outcome Y (0) does not in￿ uence the treatment assignment once we
condition on the workers￿observable features. This assumption is formally untestable,
because the available data provides no information regarding the wage distribution for
the overeducated workers in the case they were well matched (Yi(0) when Wi = 1),
but by using certain additional evidence its credibility can be supported/rejected. The
data used in our analysis includes information on a large number of worker and job
characteristics collected using the same sample and questionnaire for overeducated and
well-matched (treated and not treated) workers. Nevertheless, unobserved workers￿het-
erogeneity and/or measurement errors might be important factors that in￿ uence the
treatment assignment. Low ability workers might need extra years of education to per-
form well their jobs. Similarly, discouraged workers might be more inclined to answer
that they feel properly suited to a more demanding job. If the market were to attribute23
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greatly a⁄ected. In case d), which looks at (p11 = 0:9; p10 = 0:5; p01 = 0:2; p00 = 0:1);
the estimated coe¢ cient is even larger, at -0.17, and highly signi￿cant. The most strin-
gent tests are in cases e) to g), where ￿low ability￿individuals are strongly represented
among the treated and those obtaining lower than average wages. Even in case g), where
we assume that 90% of the overeducated and 40% of the well-matched who su⁄er a wage
penalty are ￿low ability￿workers (p11 = 0:9; p10 = 0:5; p01 = 0:4; p00 = 0:1); there is a
sizable and statistically signi￿cant negative impact of educational mismatch on wages:
￿0:10 (s.e. 0:019). On top of the strong selection and outcome e⁄ects we need to make
the extreme assumption that nobody among the well-matched workers with a wage above
the mean belongs to the ￿low ability￿group (p00=0) in order to ￿nd an estimated impact
close to zero. This is so for case g) (p11 = 0:9; p10 = 0:5; p01 = 0:4; p00 = 0), where the
average coe¢ cient is -0.03 (s.e. 0.017). Similar conclusions are reached with the male
sample, presented in Table 8. In sum, to move the ATT away from the baseline results
we need to make fairly extreme assumptions regarding the selection e⁄ects of U: This
bring us to conclude that it is unlikely that unobserved heterogeneity is driving the main
results presented in the paper.10
7 Conclusions
Estonia has undergone a rapid transition from a centrally planned to a market economy,
and then later a rapid transformation in its productive structure as a consequence of
its EU accession. This is an ongoing process and the consequences are likely to be long
lasting. This paper documents one of the outcomes of such a process: the mismatch
between the formal education of workers and the curricular content of their jobs.
Our research ￿nds that there is a relatively high prevalence of educational mismatch
in Estonia; more than 12% of workers are formally overeducated for their jobs. More
10Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008) show that non parametric bounds for the ATT as those proposed
by Manski (1990) have an equivalent in terms of the distribution of U. The assumptions concerning the
confounder U that will lead the ATT to the bounds are quite extreme and highly implausible, explaining
why non parametric bounds are often uninformative. For the lower bound, we need to assume that among
the treated there are only individuals with U = 1, i.e. p11 = p10 = 1; and among the well matched all
the less able su⁄er a wage penalty, i.e. p01 = 1: The upper bound is instead constructed as p11 = p10 = 1
and p01 = 0. The bounds of the ATT are (-0.56, 0.14) for females and (-0.56, 0.19) for males.27
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importantly, the incidence and wage penalty for being overeducated in Estonia increases
with age, and is most concentrated among those workers who attended school during
the centrally planned regime. The wage penalties associated with overeducation are
fairly signi￿cant (around 2 %), except among younger cohorts, a group in which wage
losses associated with overeducation are of a magnitude comparable to those found in
other European countries. A battery of robustness checks using non-parametric methods
suggests that it is unlikely that these results are driven by unobserved heterogeneity.
Our ￿ndings are consistent with the expectations from a rapidly changing transition
economy. A fast speed of structural change can render obsolete educational diplomas that
were obtained in the previous regime, triggering a mismatch between formal education
and labour demand. This implies that summary indicators of average years of schooling
in transition countries should be treated with caution, since they might constitute a poor
proxy for the true human capital of the working age population.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Incidence of overeducation by Gender and Age32
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